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INTRODUCTION 
 On June 1, 2018, Bon Secours, a Virginia health system, filed a letter of intent with the 
Virginia Department of Health (VDH) for a certificate of public need (COPN).1 The health 
system wanted to establish a new hospital in the North Suffolk area of Hampton Roads.2 Just six 
days later on June 7, 2018, Sentara Healthcare filed a similar letter of intent, detailing its plans to 
open a hospital at one of its medical center locations in Suffolk.3 However, because of the 
similarities between the two proposals, in both services offered and location, the applications 
ultimately were pitted against each other—the Commissioner would only approve of one project 
going forward.4 In this instance, Bon Secours won and Sentara conceded, stating, “[a]n 
opportunity to develop a hospital may arise in the future and we will take appropriate action at 
that time.”5 
This competition between medical entities is how COPN frequently operates in the 
Commonwealth of Virginia—the COPN program cultivates turf wars between health care 
entities attempting to enter the market or expand.6 Originally enacted in 1973, Virginia’s COPN 
                                                      
1 Elizabeth Simpson, Sentara Announces Plan for a 24-Bed Hospital in Suffolk, Similar in Size to 
Bon Secours’ Project, VIRGINIAN-PILOT (June 18, 2018), https://pilotonline.com/news/local/healt 
h/article_70d5c492-7323-11e8-ab8e-d397003e2b17.html.  
 
2 See id. 
 
3 See id. 
 
4 See id.; see also Alex Perry, Two Proposals, One Recommended, SUFFOLK NEWS-HERALD 
(Oct. 22, 2018), https://www.suffolknewsherald.com/2018/10/22/two-proposals-one-
recommended/.   
 
5 Press Release, Steve Julian, Sentara in Suffolk COPN Update, Sentara (Nov. 7, 2018), 
https://www.sentara.com/hampton-roads-virginia/support-sentara-in-suffolk.aspx.  
 
6 See generally VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-102.3 (2019).  
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statute aimed “to promote comprehensive health planning in order to help meet the health needs 
of the public” and “to assist in promoting the highest quality of health care at the lowest possible 
cost.”7 Since its enactment, however, there has been a constant debate over whether the program 
is effective in achieving these goals.  
Opponents to COPN argue that the regulations are overly restrictive and essentially 
eliminate a free market system for health care.8 They argue that Virginia’s COPN program limits 
competition, stifles innovation, and ultimately drives up health care costs while reducing access.9 
On the other hand, COPN supporters point out that health care, which is subject to a multitude of 
regulations, does not operate as a free market.10 Thus, supporters suggest that Virginia’s COPN 
program is a positive influence on health care because it incentivizes medical entities to provide 
charity care—often a condition of certificate approval—and protects hospitals and health 
systems from the burdens of uncompensated care, while also keeping costs low and access 
                                                      
7 See Certificate of Public Need Workgroup, Final Report, Va. Dep’t of Health 27 (Dec. 4, 
2015), http://www.vdh.virginia.gov/content/uploads/sites/96/2017/10/Certificate-of-Public-
Need-Workgroup-Final-Report.pdf.  
 
8 See, e.g., Matthew D. Mitchell, Certificate-of-Need Laws: Are They Achieving Their Goals, 
Mercatus on Policy, MERCATUS CENTER (2017), 
https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/mercatus-mitchell-con-qa-mop-v1.pdf.  
  
9 See, e.g., id.  
 
10 See, e.g., R. Brent Rawlings, The Importance of COPN: Serving the Public Need, Supporting 
Virginia’s Health Care System, Focus, Va. Hospital & Healthcare Ass’n (2016), 
http://www.vhha.com/communications/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/2016/02/VHHA-January-
February-FOCUS-Publication.pdf. 
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high.11 With such polarizing views, Virginia’s General Assembly has persistently grappled with 
the COPN program’s future—should the program be left alone, reformed, or scrapped entirely?12  
  While debates on the COPN program have persisted for decades, the landscape of health 
care recently changed in Virginia. On May 30, 2018, Virginia’s Senate voted to expand 
Medicaid coverage under the Affordable Care Act and, therefore, extend Medicaid eligibility to 
an additional 400,000 Virginians.13 On November 1, 2018, enrollment under the expanded 
Medicaid began and by the end of the month over 100,000 Virginians enrolled through the 
government program; this enrollment was just the start, however, and projections estimate that 
375,000 low-income residents will enroll in Medicaid by July 2020.14 Although many people 
remain uninsured within the state, the Medicaid expansion has significantly increased the 
number of insured Virginians, thereby lessening the burdens of uncompensated care on hospitals 
and health systems.15 
 This paper discusses the future of Virginia’s COPN program after Medicaid expansion. 
Following the launch of Medicaid expansion, many people wonder whether a smaller 
uncompensated care burden on hospitals and health systems will create more opportunities for a 
                                                      
 
11 See, e.g., id.   
 
12 See Final Report, supra note 7, at 11-13 (discussing the various studies and recommendations 
aimed at reforming or repealing Virginia’s COPN program).  
 
13 Abby Goodnough, After Years of Trying, Virginia Finally Will Expand Medicaid, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 30, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/30/health/medicaid-expansion-virginia.html.  
 
14 Laura Vozzella, Enrollment in Virginia’s Expanded Medicaid Program is Beating Projections, 
WASH. POST (Nov. 29, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/virginia-politics/enrollmen 
t-in-virginias-expanded-medicaid-program-is-beating-projections/2018/11/29/a62bfce6-f281-11e 
8-aeea-b85fd44449f5_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.a20dc3b74cd8.  
 
15 See id.  
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free market to exist in Virginia’s health care regime, thereby compelling the repeal of Virginia’s 
COPN program. However, this paper ultimately argues that such repeal would be premature, as 
hospitals and health systems still face uncompensated care burdens from the over 300,000 
uninsured Virginians and lower reimbursement rates from Medicaid patients.16 Instead, the 
COPN program should reform its charity care requirements to ensure that providers are able to 
meet the requirement with a greater population of insured Virginians.  
 The Paper will proceed in five parts. Part I will present the history of COPN, both 
nationally and in Virginia. Next, Part II will detail Virginia’s COPN program and its State 
Medical Facilities Plan. Part III will discuss the current debate for and against the COPN 
program. In Part IV, this Paper will discuss the market irregularities that the health care industry 
faces and how Virginia’s COPN program helps insulate hospitals from these market imbalances. 
Lastly, Part V will focus on the impact that the Medicaid expansion has on the COPN program, 
focusing particularly on the effects of the program’s charity care requirements. This Paper will 
conclude that Virginia’s COPN program should be reformed in light of Medicaid expansion, 
rather than repealed.    
I. THE HISTORY OF COPN 
 Although Virginia uses the term “certificate of public need,” the more common name 
throughout the United States is “certificate of need” (CON).17 Currently, more than thirty-five 
                                                      
16 See Katie O’Connor, About 323,000 Will Remain Uninsured After Medicaid Expansion. Will 
Virginia’s Free Clinics Still Be Able To Meet the Need?, VA. MERCURY (Aug. 20, 2018), 
https://www.virginiamercury.com/2018/08/20/about-323000-will-remain-uninsured-after-
medicaid-expansion-will-virginias-free-clinics-still-be-able-to-meet-the-need/.  
 
17 This paper will use “COPN” when referring to Virginia’s program. However, all other 
discussions will use the more common “CON.” 
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U.S. states and territories require some form of CON issuance before a health care entity can 
construct or expand a facility, offer a new service, or purchase certain equipment.18 
Understanding the history of CON laws provides context behind the rationale for the 
continuation of such laws today. Accordingly, this Part will present the history of CON laws in 
the United States and then discuss the origins of COPN in Virginia.  
A. History in the United States  
 During the post-World War II era there was a perceived shortage and maldistribution of 
hospitals throughout the United States.19  The Hospital Survey and Construction Act (the “Hill-
Burton Act”) was enacted in 1946 with the purpose in part “to survey the need for construction 
of hospitals, and to develop programs for construction of such public and other nonprofit 
hospitals as will, in conjunction with existing facilities, afford the necessary physical facilities 
for furnishing adequate hospital, clinic, and similar services to all their people.”20 Essentially, the 
Hill-Burton Act aimed to promote local hospital planning by providing federal subsidies for 
hospital construction.21  
 At the same time, there was a concern over the rising costs of healthcare. On July 30, 
1965, President Lyndon B. Johnson signed Medicare into law, facilitating health insurance 
                                                      
18 Certificate of Need State Laws, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl 
.org/research/health/con-certificate-of-need-state-laws.aspx (last visited Apr. 26, 2019).  
 
19 Lawrence J. Clark, et. al, The Impact of Hill-Burton: An Analysis of Hospital Bed and 
Physician Distribution in the United States, 1950-1970, 18 MED. CARE 532, 532 (May 1980).  
 
20 Hospital Survey and Construction Act, Pub. L. No. 79-725 § 2, tit. VI, 60 Stat. 1040, 1041-
1049 (1946).    
 
21 See id. 
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coverage for 19 million Americans.22 However, the initial five years of the Medicare program 
saw dramatic escalation of overall hospital costs, which became a major federal concern. Milton 
Roemer, who famously stated, “A built bed is a filled bed,” theorized that a direct correlation 
exists between an oversupply of resources and a demand for those resources when third-party 
reimbursement is available.23 Thus, Roemer’s theories on oversupply and overutilization shifted 
the focus of health planning from a solution for hospital shortages to a health care cost-
containment mechanism.24  
Accordingly, policymakers actively supported health planning because it aimed to 
facilitate needed hospital development, while also mitigating high health care costs associated 
with oversupply.25 The first CON statute was enacted in New York in 1966 and required that any 
hospital or nursing home receive state approval prior to initiating construction.26 By 1973, 
twenty states had ratified similar CON laws,27 and the federal government followed suit, passing 
                                                      
22 See Johnson Signs Medicare Into Law, This Day in History, HISTORY, 
https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/johnson-signs-medicare-into-law (last visited Apr. 
26, 2019).  
 
23 See Milton I. Roemer, M.D., Bed Supply and Hospital Utilization: A Natural Experiment, J. 
AM. HOSP. ASS’N at 36 (Nov. 1, 1961).   
 
24 See Emily Whelan Parento, Certificate of Need in the Post-Affordable Care Act Era, 105 KY. 
L.J. 201, 210 (2016-2017).  
 
25 See id. at 211.  
 
26 See Gerard R. Goulet, Certificate-of-Need Over Hospitals in Rhode Island: A Forty-Year 
Retrospective, 15 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 127, 129 (Spring 2010) (“The underlying … 
premise of the regulatory scheme was that the major component of price increases in the health 
care sector was attributable to the non-payroll cost increases in rent, depreciation, interest, 
equipment and supplies which accompanied the overcapacity…”). 
 
27 See Clark C. Havighurst, Regulation of Health Facilities and Services by “Certificate of 
Need”, 59 VA. L. REV. 1143, 1144 (Oct. 1973).  
 
 8 
the National Health Planning and Resource Development Act of 1974 (NHPRDA).28 The Act 
came partly in response to Medicare and provided significant government funding for health 
planning activities, but only upon a state’s adoption of a CON program. 29 Thus, every state 
except Louisiana had a CON program by 1980.30 
 The NHPRDA had lofty aims, but was short-lived. During the early 1980s, the political 
climate fostered deregulation31 and the NHPRDA was ultimately repealed in 1987.32  However, 
most of the states that had enacted CON statutes kept them, and, consequently, regulation shifted 
from federal regulation to state-based.33 Today, more than thirty-five U.S. states and territories 
maintain CON laws, including Virginia.34  
 
                                                      
28 National Health Planning and Resource Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-641, 88 
Stat. 2225 (1975). 
 
29 See id.  (“The massive infusion of Federal funds into the existing health care system [that] 
contributed to inflationary increases in the cost of health care and failed to produce an adequate 
supply or distribution of health resources and consequently has not made possible equal access 
for everyone to such resources.”) 
 
30 See James B. Simpson, Full Circle: The Return of Certificate of Need Regulation of Health 
Facilities to State Control, 19 Ind. L. Rev. 1025, 1055 (1986).  
 
31 See id. at 1026 (“With the advent of the Reagan administration in 1980, federal support for 
certificate of need fell on hard times. The administration entered office with an anti-regulatory 
platform and a strong interest in using market incentives rather than regulatory controls to 
restrain the rising costs of health programs.”).  
 
32Evan M. Melhado, Health Planning in the United States and the Decline of Public-interest 
Policymaking, 84 MILBANK Q. 359, 439 (2006).  
  
33 See id. (“Federal legislation that kept the [NHPRDA] alive with lower funding after September 
30, 1982, included provisions that freed the states to depart from federal requirements regarding 
CON. The outright repeal … left the states without any federal funding for CON regulation or 
federal requirements for its conduct.”).   
 
34 See Certificate of Need State Laws, supra note 18.  
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B. History in Virginia  
 In 1971, a Special Session of the General Assembly passed a joint resolution to establish 
a “Commission to study prepaid health care plans and costs of medical, surgical and hospital 
services and insurance.”35 The study resulted in various recommendations and the Virginia 
legislature considered two different options: (1) establish an independent health services cost 
review commission to set rates for all payors, including Medicaid and Medicare or (2) enact a 
COPN program.36 The latter went forward and Virginia enacted its COPN statute on July 1, 
1973, just one year prior to the enactment of the NHPRDA.  
 Virginia’s COPN statute required owners of health care facilities to obtain state approval 
prior to undertaking “(1) a capital expenditure in excess of $150,000, (2) an alteration in bed 
capacity, or (3) a change in service.”37 Through its implementation, the Virginia legislature 
hoped to see a decrease in the cost of health care for consumers and a better distribution of health 
care facilities and services. The Virginia program received full designation for complying with 
the federal guidelines of the NHPRDA, which allowed Virginia to receive approximately $35 
million annually in federal assistance.38 When the NHPRDA was later repealed, Virginia began 
                                                      
 
35 See Certificate of Need in Virginia, JOINT LEGIS. AUDIT & REV. COMMISSION, VA. GEN. 
ASSEMBLY at 4 (Aug. 13, 1979), http://jlarc.virginia.gov/pdfs/reports/Rpt21.pdf.  
 
36 John N. Simpson, Health Care: History of the Certificate of Need, RICHMOND TIMES-
DISPATCH (July 25, 2015), https://www.richmond.com/opinion/their-opinion/guest-
columnists/health-care-history-of-the-certificate-of-need/article_9b2f5ceb-9341-547b-a511-
2a4fee9d2408.html.  
 
37 See Certificate of Need in Virginia, supra note 35, at I.  
 
38 See id. at 1, 6.  
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studying the effectiveness of the COPN statute, thus generating numerous debates and 
recommendations.39  
 Since the 1980s, Virginia’s COPN regulations have undergone frequent studies, which 
have resulted in varied recommendations—suggestions for the expansion of certain regulations, 
the deregulation of certain facilities and services, and full repeal.40 However, after over forty 
years with only minor legislative changes, Virginia’s COPN program remains in effect.41  
II. VIRGINIA’S COPN PROGRAM 
 In Virginia, prior to establishing or expanding certain types of health care projects, the 
VDH Commissioner must determine that a public need exists for such project.42 This 
determination is largely based on the State Medical Facilities Plan (SMFP).43 This Part will first 
review Virginia’s COPN program, focusing largely on the authority established under the COPN 
statute and the factors considered in granting a certificate; next, this Part will discuss the role of 
the SMFP.  
A. COPN—Statutory Authority, Aims, and Conditions  
 Virginia’s COPN program is one of the more comprehensive health planning programs in 
the United States, regulating medical care facilities, such as general hospitals, ambulatory 
surgical centers, and psychiatric care facilities, medical imaging technologies, and numerous 
                                                      
39 See Final Report, supra note 7, at 12-13.  
 
40 See id. The Work Group looks at the different studies from the 1980s including: The Baliles 
Commission, the 1996 Joint Commission on Health Care Study, the 1998 Special Joint 
Subcommittee study, and the 2000 Joint Commission on Health Care Deregulation Plan. See id.   
 
41 See VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-102.3 (2019). 
 
42 See id.  
 
43 See id. § 32.1-102.3(B)(3) (2019).  
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other facilities and services.44 Accordingly, health care entities wishing to expand or develop a 
facility or service likely must apply for a COPN. While this Paper does not detail Virginia’s 
COPN application process, it should be noted that applying for a certificate in Virginia is a 
burdensome process. The application itself is very extensive, requiring months of preparation, a 
pile of paperwork, and often necessitating legal assistance.45 There is also a fee for applying 
equal to 1 percent of the project’s value, with a maximum cap of $20,000.46 Additionally, the 
application process may become contentious as other parties may contest facts presented in an 
application47 or submit competing applications.48  
 Although Virginia’s COPN program is comprehensive and burdensome for the parties 
involved, the goals of the program attempt to justify these obstacles by improving health care 
throughout the state. There are three main aims of the COPN program: (1) to improve the 
patient’s care experience in terms of quality and satisfaction; (2) to improve the health of all 
                                                      
44 See Matthew D. Mitchell, Virginia’s Certificate-of-Public-Need Law: A Comparison with 
Other States, MERCATUS CENTER, GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY at 4 (Apr. 18, 2018), 
https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/mitchell_-_testimony_-_virginias_certificate-of-public-
need_law_a_comparison_with_other_states_-_v1.pdf.  
 
45 See, e.g., Jonathan M. Joseph, A Primer on Virginia’s Certificate of Public Need Process, 
Christian & Barton,  LLP (2015) http://www.cblaw.com/uploads/files/Health-
Care/COPN%20Virginia_ 2015.pdf (last visited Apr. 26, 2019).  
 
46 12 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 5-220-10 (defining “application fees”).   
 
47 Id. at § 5-220-240. 
 
48 Id. at § 5-220-220. 
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people in Virginia; and (3) to reduce the cost of health care.49 Additionally, through conditions 
placed on approved certificates, the COPN program expands charity care within the state.50  
 Section 32.1-102.3 of the Virginia Code establishes the COPN program, stating, “No 
person shall commence any project without first obtaining a certificate issued by the 
Commissioner. No certificate may be issued unless the Commissioner has determined that a 
public need for the project has been demonstrated.”51 Through the statute, the VDH 
Commissioner is authorized to approve or deny certification for new projects.52 The statute also 
details eight considerations for the Commissioner to utilize in determining whether to grant a 
certificate. 53 In addition to considering guidance established from the SMFP, the Commissioner 
                                                      
49 See Final Report, supra note 7 at 27; see also The IHI Triple Aim, INST. FOR HEALTHCARE 
IMPROVEMENT, http://www.ihi.org/Engage/Initiatives/TripleAim/Pages/default.aspx (last visited 
Apr. 26, 2016).  
 
50 See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 32.1-102.2(C), 32.1-102.4(F) (2019); 12 VA. ADMIN. CODE §§ 5-220-
270(A), 5-220-420(A) (2019). 
 
51 See VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-102.3. 
 
52 See id.  
 
53 See id. § 32.1-102.3(B). Although the eight factors are lengthy, it is important to 
consider these factors, as they provide more context on the purpose and function of 
Virginia’s COPN program. Id. The eight factors include:  
(1) The extent to which the proposed service or facility will provide or increase 
access to needed services for residents of the area to be served, and the effects that 
the proposed service or facility will have on access to needed services in areas 
having distinct and unique geographic, socioeconomic, cultural, transportation, 
and other barriers to access to care; (2) The extent to which the project will meet 
the needs of the residents of the area to be served, as demonstrated by each of the 
following: (i) the level of community support for the project demonstrated by 
citizens, businesses, and governmental leaders representing the area to be served; 
(ii) the availability of reasonable alternatives to the proposed service or facility 
that would meet the needs of the population in a less costly, more efficient, or 
more effective manner; (iii) any recommendation or report of the regional health 
planning agency regarding an application for a certificate that is required to be 
submitted to the Commissioner pursuant to subsection B of § 32.1-102.6; (iv) any 
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is directed to consider other factors, such as the extent to which a project ensures quality of 
services, increases health care access, reduces health care costs, and aids in providing charity 
care.54 Thus, the Commissioner’s considerations closely align with the overarching goals of 
Virginia’s COPN program.55   
 As a condition for project approval, the COPN program often requires hospitals and other 
health care providers provide charity care. Under the COPN program, the Commissioner is 
authorized to condition the approval of a certificate upon agreement by the applicant to provide 
                                                      
costs and benefits of the project; (v) the financial accessibility of the project to the 
residents of the area to be served, including indigent residents; and (vi) at the 
discretion of the Commissioner, any other factors as may be relevant to the 
determination of public need for a project; (3) The extent to which the application 
is consistent with the State Medical Facilities Plan; (4) The extent to which the 
proposed service or facility fosters institutional competition that benefits the area 
to be served while improving access to essential health care services for all 
persons in the area to be served; (5) The relationship of the project to the existing 
health care system of the area to be served, including the utilization and efficiency 
of existing services or facilities; (6) The feasibility of the project, including the 
financial benefits of the project to the applicant, the cost of construction, the 
availability of financial and human resources, and the cost of capital; (7) The 
extent to which the project provides improvements or innovations in the financing 
and delivery of health services, as demonstrated by: (i) the introduction of new 
technology that promotes quality, cost effectiveness, or both in the delivery of 
health care services; (ii) the potential for provision of services on an outpatient 
basis; (iii) any cooperative efforts to meet regional health care needs; and (iv) at 
the discretion of the Commissioner, any other factors as may be appropriate; and 
(8) In the case of a project proposed by or affecting a teaching hospital associated 
with a public institution of higher education or a medical school in the area to be 
served, (i) the unique research, training, and clinical mission of the teaching 
hospital or medical school, and (ii) any contribution the teaching hospital or 
medical school may provide in the delivery, innovation, and improvement of 
health care for citizens of the Commonwealth, including indigent or underserved 
populations. Id.  
 
54 Id.  
 
55 See supra note 49 and accompanying text.  
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medical care to indigents at a reduced rate.56 With this condition, the certificate holder must 
provide documentation to VDH exhibiting that the charity care conditions were met.57 However, 
VDH can also approve of alternative means of satisfying the charity care requirements if a 
certificate holder is unable or fails to meet the conditions.58 If the certificate holder fails to 
satisfy the conditions of compliance all together, such person will be subject to a civil penalty of 
up to $100 per violation per day until the date of compliance.59 Certificates requiring charity care 
conditions occur frequently for all types of projects and services.60  
B.  The State Medical Facilities Plan   
 The SMFP is a planning document that is adopted by the Board of Health.61 Under the 
Virginia Code, the Board of Health must appoint and convene an SMFP task force at least once 
every two years.62 The task force must include no fewer than fifteen individuals consisting of 
VDH representatives, Division of COPN representatives, regional health planning agencies 
representatives, health care provider representatives, academic medical community 
                                                      
56 See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 32.1-102.2(C), 32.1-102.4(F) (2019); 12 VA. ADMIN. CODE §§ 5-220-
270(A), 5-220-420(A) (2019). 
 
57 VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-102.4(F).  
 
58 Id.   
 
59 Id.   
 
60 See Certificate of Public Need Program, Monthly Activity Report, VA. DEP’T OF HEALTH 
(April 2019) http://www.vdh.virginia.gov/content/uploads/sites/96/2019/04/COPN-Monthly-
Report-April-2019.xlsx.  
 
61 See VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-102.1. 
 
62 See id. § 32.1-102.2:1. 
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representatives, medical technology experts, and health insurers.63 The task force is instructed to 
review the current SMFP and update or validate the regulations therein at least every four 
years.64  
 The SMFP must include “(i) methodologies for projecting need for medical care facility 
beds and services; (ii) statistical information on the availability of medical care facilities and 
services; and (iii) procedures, criteria and standards for review of applications for projects for 
medical care facilities and services.”65 Ultimately the SMFP serves as a guide for health care 
facilities hoping to develop new facilities or services or expand existing ones.   
 The SMFP consists of a group of regulations in the Virginia Administrative Code. 
Notably, the SMFP lists five Guiding Principles in the Development of Project Review Criteria 
and Standards.66 These Guiding Principles ensure that the project is meeting the aims of the 
state’s COPN program. The Guiding Principles state:  
1. The COPN program is based on the understanding that excess capacity or 
underutilization of medical facilities are detrimental to both cost effectiveness 
and quality of medical services in Virginia.  
2. The COPN programs seeks the geographical distribution of medical facilities 
and to promote the availability and accessibility of proven technologies.  
3. The COPN program seeks to promote the development and maintenance of 
services and access to those services by every person who needs them without 
respect to their ability to pay.  
4. The COPN program seeks to encourage the conversion of facilities to new and 
efficient uses and the reallocation of resources to meet evolving community 
needs.  
                                                      
63 Id.  
 
64 Id.  
 
65 Id. § 32.1-102.1. 
 
66 12 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 5-230-30 (2019).  
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5. The COPN program discourages the proliferation of services that would 
undermine the ability of essential community providers to maintain their 
financial viability.67  
 
 Beyond the guiding principles, the SMFP also contains review standards and criteria for 
approving a COPN project. For instance, regulations regarding the addition or expansion of PET 
services are included in the SMFP.68 The first criterion needed for project approval is a showing 
of need; thus, the SMFP provides that “proposals for mobile PET or PET/CT scanners should 
demonstrate that, for the relevant reporting period, at least 230 PET or PET/CT appropriate 
patients were seen and that the proposed mobile unit will not significantly reduce the utilization 
of existing providers in the health planning district.”69 Through this language, it is clear that 
projects will only be approved when an actual need is evidenced in the area. The subsequent 
regulations then set staffing70 and travel time71 parameters for the PET scanner project. This 
example of a PET scanner is only one of many listed medical services or projects detailed in the 
SMFP.  
III. THE CURRENT DEBATE 
 This paper does not seek to establish whether or not the COPN program is successful in 
achieving its three main aims—improving patient care, improving health of all Virginians, and 
reducing costs—as these arguments have been discussed extensively by industry players and 
                                                      
67 Id.  
 
68 Id. § 5-230-230. 
 
69 Id.  
 
70 Id. § 5-230-240. 
 
71 Id. § 5-230-250. 
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academics. However, to understand the current climate surrounding the COPN program, it is 
important to understand the arguments on each side.  
 While Virginia’s COPN program has lofty aims, opponents argue that the regulations are 
ineffective and produce contrary results—increased costs with decreased access.72 Skeptics 
contend that the COPN program continues due to political factors and the special interests of key 
health care players, such as large hospitals.73 In her article on CON, Professor Emily Whelan 
Parento discussed this overriding cynicism towards CON programs, stating: “Among academic 
scholars, it is rare to find ardent, or even lukewarm defenders of CON programs. Although the 
arguments for the effectiveness of CON have not been conclusively disproven, the prevailing 
view reflects considerable skepticism about the ability of CON programs to achieve any of their 
intended aims.”74 Thus, to better understand the current debate over COPN, it is imperative to 
discuss these arguments over its potential shortcomings.  
A. Does COPN Improve Patient Care? 
 The first goal of the COPN program is to improve patient care, which essentially aims to 
promote high quality health care. COPN supporters argue that procedural volume is linked to 
better outcomes.75 In other words, as providers and facilities treat the same conditions or perform 
                                                      
72 See, e.g., Mitchell, supra note 8.  
 
73 See Matthew Mitchell & Steven Monaghan, Virginia Policy Puts Special Interests Above 
Patients, WASH. POST (Oct. 17, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/all-opinions-are-
local/wp/2017/10/17/virginia-policy-puts-special-interests-above-
patients/?utm_term=.afbd625e47a2.  
 
74 See Whelan Parento, supra note 24, at 218-19.  
 
75 See, e.g., id. at 222 (citing Margaret Gillingham & Kathleen Galbraith, The Role of Certificate 
of Need Legislation: A Survey, 19 J. PUB. BUDGETING, ACCT’G & FIN. MGMT. 372 (2007)).  
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the same procedures, they gain more experience and become more proficient, resulting in higher 
quality care.76 This rationale has been largely upheld by the Virginia court system in cases where 
the VDH Commissioner relies on quality measures as a factor in determining whether to approve 
or deny certification.77 In a 2000 Supreme Court of Virginia case, the Court upheld the 
Commissioner’s decision to deny certification because “the establishment of an additional liver 
transplant facility at Sentara ‘may erode the quality of other transplant centers by reducing the 
volume of liver transplants at the other centers.’”78 Similarly, in 2014 the Virginia Court of 
Appeals upheld the Commissioner’s decision to deny approval of a second neonatal intensive 
care unit when such denial was based in part on the Commissioner’s concern that “sufficient 
volume would not exist to support proficiency and quality” at both facilities.79 
 On the other hand, opponents to COPN programs argue that the lack of competition 
inherent in the regulatory scheme ultimately lowers quality and patient satisfaction. In contrast to 
the volume-outcome quality link suggested by COPN supporters, opponents argue that the lack 
of competition provides shelter for the weaker providers without encouraging improvement; the 
                                                      
76 See id.; see also Martin Gaynor et. al, The Volume-Outcome Effect, Scale Economies, and 
Learning-by-Doing, 95 AMERICAN ECON. REV. 243, 243 (2005).  
 
77 It should be noted that the state courts give deference to the Commissioner’s decision. See 
Tidewater Psychiatric, Inc. v. Buttery, 8 Va. App. 380, 386 (“The standard of review in COPN 
cases, generally is ‘arbitrary and capricious.’ … [W]hen an agency is acting within its statutory 
authority and is applying the basic law delegating that authority in rendering the decision, the 
issues are legal issues that fall within the specialized competence of the health commissioner, 
and the court should give deference to the commissioner’s decisions unless they were ‘arbitrary 
and capricious.’”).  
 
78 See State Health Comm’r v. Sentara Norfolk Gen. Hosp., 260 Va. 267, 270 (Va. 2000).  
 
79 See Lewis-Gale Med. Ctr., LLC v. Romero, No. 1289-13-3, 2014 Va. App. LEXIS 158, *38-
39 (Va. App., Apr. 29, 2014).  
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restrictions placed on market entry also limit high-quality providers from being challenged by 
competitors and improving further.80 In a study produced by the Mercatus Center81 at George 
Mason University, statistical findings indicated that rates for pneumonia, heart failure, and heart 
attacks were lower in hospitals located in states that did not have a CON program.82 However, 
there are issues with studies that attempt to connect CON laws with quality—measuring quality 
based on the correlation between CON laws and outcomes fails to prove causation.83 
Additionally, it is difficult to determine if a relationship exists between CON laws and health 
care outcomes, as other studies have reached opposite conclusions84 or shown that a relationship 
does not exist at all.85   
                                                      
80 See Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Certificate of Need Laws: A Prescription for Higher Costs, 30 
ANTITRUST 52, 53 (2015).  
 
81 About, Mercatus Center, George Mason University, https://www.mercatus.org/about (last 
visited Apr. 26, 2019). The Mercatus Center at is a research, education, and outreach think tank 
that focuses on free-market research. Id. The center is largely funded by the conservative-leaning 
Charles Koch Foundation. See Erica L. Green & Stephanie Saul, What Charles Koch and Other 
Donors to George Mason University Got for Their Money, N.Y TIMES (May 5, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/05/us/koch-donors-george-mason.html.   
 
82 See Thomas Stratmann & David Wille, Certificate-of-Need Laws and Hospital Quality, 
Mercatus Working Paper, MERCATUS CENTER (Sept. 2016).  
 
83 See, e.g., Mitchell, supra note 8, at 3. 
 
84 See Mary S. Vaugh-Sarrazin et al., Mortality in Medicare Beneficiaries Following Coronary 
Artery Bypass Graft Surgery in States With and Without Certificate of Need Regulation, 288 
JAMA 1859, 1859 (2002) (finding that mortality was higher in states without certificate of need 
regulations compared with states with certificate of need regulation); see also Gaynor et. al, 
supra note 76, at 243 (“There is a large empirical literature documenting the existence of a 
positive correlation between the number of times a hospital performs a given surgical procedure 
and the rate of good health outcomes achieved by patients at that hospital receiving that 
procedure.”).  
 
85 See, e.g., Polsky et. al, The Effect of Entry Regulation in the Health Care Sector: The Case of 
Home Health, 110 J. PUBLIC ECON. 1, 11 (2014) (“We therefore conclude that removing CON 
for home health would have negligible system-wide effects on health care costs and quality.”).  
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B. Does COPN Improve Health of All Virginians?  
 The second aim of Virginia’s COPN program, improving health care for all Virginians, 
largely focuses on access. With its roots in facilitating hospital distribution, Virginia’s COPN 
program attempts to distribute health care resources “in areas having distinct and unique 
geographic, socioeconomic, cultural, transportation, and other barriers to access to care.”86 
However, the COPN program limits the development or expansion of health care facilities and 
services; thus, opponents to Virginia’s COPN program argue that, by definition, the program 
restricts supply and consequently reduces access.87 In another Mercatus-initiated study, which 
used supply as a proxy for access,88 it was reported that states with CON laws have 13 percent 
fewer hospital beds per 100,000 people than states without CON laws.89 This study also showed 
that states with CON programs had fewer CT-scanners and MRI machines available, concluding 
that “CON regulation decreases the availability of each of these services.”90  
 Contrastingly, supporters argue that the COPN program enhances access to all Virginians 
by distributing resources based on citizens’ needs, rather than provider profitability. It has been 
seen that states that have eliminated their CON programs have subsequently reduced health care 
                                                      
86 VA CODE ANN. § 32.1-102.3(B)(1) (2019).  
 
87 See Mitchell, supra note 8, at 2.  
 
88 It should be noted that using supply as a proxy for access is not a precise metric. See Whelan 
Parento, supra note 24, at 228 (“Admittedly, supply of services is an imprecise metric at best, 
because the fact that providers are located in a given geographic area does not mean that they are 
willing to provide services to all patients.”).  
 
89 Thomas Stratmann & Jacob W. Russ, Do Certificate-of-Need Laws Increase Indigent Care?, 
Mercatus Working Paper, MERCATUS CENTER at 3 (2014), 
https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/Stratmann-Certificate-of-Need.pdf.  
 
90 See id. at 12. 
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services in rural, inner city, and other areas with high or special needs.91 Simultaneously, health 
care services in affluent areas or profitable specialties have dramatically increased.92 Thus, 
supporters contend that the COPN program enhances the distribution of all services to all 
Virginians by basing distribution on need rather than opportunistic incentives.  
C. Does COPN Reduce Health Care Costs?  
 The final aim of Virginia’s COPN program is to reduce health care costs. As discussed 
previously, the COPN program was initiated in part as a cost-cutting mechanism. COPN 
supporters continue to argue that oversupply and overutilization of health care services and 
facilities drive up health care costs.93 Additionally, supporters highlight that Virginia has lower 
per capita health care spending when compared to non-CON states.94 However, studies have 
indicated that states with CON programs have increased per-unit health care costs due to a lack 
of competition.95 In a joint statement to Virginia’s General Assembly from 2015, the Federal 
Trade Commission and the Department of Justice stated “By potentially shielding incumbents 
from competition, COPN laws can permit providers with market power to charge higher prices. 
When health plans and other purchasers can choose among alternative providers, they can 
                                                      
91 See South Carolina’s Certificate of Need Program, South Carolina Hospital Association at 5-6 
(Feb. 2009), https://www.scha.org/files/documents/CON09.pdf (noting that within four years of 
Ohio’s deregulation fifteen hospitals in low-income areas were closed while more profitable 
services in more affluent areas grew significantly).  
 
92 See id.  
 
93 See Roemer, supra note 23, at 36.   
 
94 See Rawlings, supra note 10, at 2 (“[T]he Commonwealth has lower per capita health care 
expenses and costs than a majority of non-COPN states (10 of 16 such states, or 63 percent).”).  
 
95 See, e.g., Mitchell, supra note 8, at 4.  
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bargain more effectively.”96 Thus, likely the most significant argument against Virginia’s COPN 
program is that it fails to lower costs.   
IV. HOW DOES VIRGINIA’S COPN PROGRAM CORRECT MARKET IMBALANCES? 
 In addition to the current debate over COPN’s three main aims, supporters stress the 
health care market’s deviations from competitive market conditions, and suggest that regulations 
are necessary to maintain key providers and services that may not be as lucrative as others. 
Additionally, proponents contend that CON laws enable increased charity care throughout the 
state.  
A. Factors that Make Health Care an Ineffective Market     
 As discussed in the previous Part, opponents to CON laws favor deregulation because 
they want the health care market to have more competition. In former FTC Commissioner 
Maureen Ohlhausen’s article, she explains this rationale: “[W]e want firms to face additional 
competition, so that customers can play firms against one another and obtain lower prices and 
better service. Competition also pressures firms to innovate, and beneficial innovation further 
improves our collective standard of living.”97 However, a free market driven by competition 
requires consumers who are able to make informed decisions on the quality and cost of the 
                                                      
96 Joint Statement of the Federal Trade Commission and the Antitrust Division of the U.S. 
Department of Justice to the Virginia Certificate of Public Need Work Group, FED. TRADE 
COMMISSION & DEP’T OF JUST. at 9 (Oct. 26, 2015). The joint statement was produced in 
response to a request from the 2015 Virginia Certificate of Public Need Work Group, which was 
commissioned by Virginia’s General Assembly to “review the current certificate of public need 
process and the impact of such process on health care services in the Commonwealth, and the 
need for changes to the current certificate of public need process.” Final Report, supra note 7 at 
3. The joint statement ultimately recommended “the Work Group and the General Assembly 
consider whether Virginia’s citizens are well served by its COPN laws, and, if not, whether they 
would benefit from the repeal or retrenchment of those laws.”  
 
97 See Ohlhausen, supra note 80, at 51.   
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products they purchase, and many people contend that these factors are not present in health 
care.98  
 A leading, and likely the most persuasive, argument for CON is that health care is not a 
free market, and therefore requires regulations to correct market imbalances. Consumer choice is 
a necessity in a free market.99 Consumers seek information about specific goods and services, 
draw comparisons between similar products, and make informed decisions prior to purchasing.100 
However, these characteristics of a functioning and efficient free market are largely absent from 
health care due to the urgent and inevitable nature of many health care needs and the third-party 
payor system of insurance.101  
 Author Chris Ladd wrote, “As I lie unconscious under a bus, I am in no position to shop 
for the best provider of ambulance services at the most reasonable price. All personal volition is 
lost. Whatever happens next, it will not be a market transaction.”102 This unpredictable and 
emergency nature of health care ultimately eliminates a consumer’s ability to make an informed 
purchase.103 Unlike most consumer choices, medical decisions are often emotional and driven by 
                                                      
98 See Lawrence Singer, Health Care Is Not a Typical Consumer Good and We Should Not Rely 
on Incentivized Consumers to Allocate It, 48 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 703, 703-05, 710-12 (2017).  
 
99 See id.  
 
100 See George B. Sproles, Conceptualization and Measurement of Optimal Consumer Decision-
Making, 17 J. CONSUMER AFF. 421, 423 (1983).  
 
101 Paul Krugman, Why Markets Can’t Cure Healthcare, NY TIMES (July 25, 2009), 
https://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/07/25/why-markets-cant-cure-healthcare/.  
 
102 Chris Ladd, There is Never a ‘Free Market’ In Health Care, FORBES (Mar. 7, 2017), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/chrisladd/2017/03/07/there-is-never-a-free-market-in-health-
care/#5288e0ff1147.  
 
103 Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM. ECON. 
REV. (Dec. 1963), https://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/82/2/PHCBP.pdf.  
 24 
urgency.104 In her dissent from the U.S. Supreme Court case, National Federation of 
Independent Business (NFIB) v. Sebelius, Justice Ginsburg noted the unique circumstances 
surrounding health care, stating, “The inevitable yet unpredictable need for medical care and the 
guarantee that emergency care will be provided when required are conditions nonexistent in 
other markets.”105 Even when situations are not urgent and consumers have the ability to seek out 
more information, an information divide persists.106 Consumers fail to acquire the requisite 
knowledge to make an informed choice, as medical prices lack transparency and the products or 
services often require complex, science-based understanding.107 Another unique factor of health 
care is that the consumers are typically not the individuals ordering or paying for the service.108 
Healthcare providers order certain services or products that are then paid for by government 
payors or insurance companies, often at rates not subject to negotiation.109 Because of these 
factors, most patients are essentially removed from decisions regarding the cost and quality of 
                                                      
 
104 See id.  
 
105 567 U.S. 519, 607-08 (2012).  
 
106 See Singer, supra note 98, at 710 (“The health care industry is not transparent with respect to 
price or quality, and its primary beneficiary – the patient – often lacks the capability and capacity 
to make informed choices.”).  
 
107 See id.; David Blumenthal, Creating Effective Health Care Markets, The Commonwealth 
Fund (Sept. 7, 2018), https://www.commonwealthfund.org/blog/2018/creating-effective-health-
care-markets (“At present, prices in the U.S. health care market are virtually unknowable. 
Quality data are scan, imperfect, and often confound even experts. Further, medicine is a 
complex science-based service”).  
 
108 See Krugman, supra note 101.  
 
109 See id.  
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their health care. Therefore, proponents of CON argue that true competition cannot exist in 
health care.   
B. How Do COPN Laws Insulate Hospitals From Market Imbalances? 
 In 1986, the federal government passed the Emergency Medical Treatment & Labor Act 
(EMTALA), which requires hospitals to treat people who enter an emergency room regardless of 
their ability to pay.110 However, after the passage of EMTALA, there was a surge in emergency 
department usage and subsequent closings of hospitals, emergency departments, trauma centers, 
maternity wards, and tertiary referral centers that could not burden the uncompensated care.111 
Today, hospitals that remain open continue to struggle with the financial demands imposed by 
EMTALA.112 In addition, the government’s Medicaid and Medicare programs continuously 
reimburse hospitals and physicians at significantly reduced rates, often falling below the actual 
cost of care.113 Thus, government regulations also place huge strain on hospitals and health 
systems, and supporters of CON argue that the regulations help level the playing field.114 
 The public needs a wide range of services, such as trauma care, burn care, obstetrics, and 
psychiatric care,115 and hospitals offer these services regardless of profitability. Consequently, 
                                                      
110 See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2012).  
 
111 See Edward Monico, Is EMTALA That Bad?, 12 Am. Med. Ass’n J. of Ethics 471, 472 (June 
2010). The article notes that EMTALA’s passage increased “ED use from 85 million to almost 
115 million visits per year.” Id.  It then states that over 560 hospitals and 1,200 emergency 
departments were closed. Id.  
 
112 See id. 
  
113 See Rawlings, supra note 10, at 1 (“Reimbursement to hospitals and physicians from the 50-
year-old Medicaid and Medicare programs continue to fall far short of the actual cost of care.”).  
 
114 See id.   
 
115 These are examples of some of the less profitable services. See id. at 2. 
 26 
hospitals rely on some of their more profitable services, such as cardiology and orthopedics,116 to 
counterbalance the revenue loss from other departments. However, competition and the free 
market focus on profitability, rather than need; therefore, there is concern that health care 
deregulation could limit health care for the low-income or uninsured patient and for those 
needing less profitable treatments.117 Expanding on this argument, the CEO of Bon Secours 
Health System, Toni Ardabell, stated: 
Any investor can come in and decide they’re going to build a freestanding  surgery 
center or freestanding radiology center, and never have to take a non-paying patient 
or a Medicaid patient or a Medicare patient. … They can really take the best payers 
or take cash or whatever scenario they set up. Whereas hospitals have to take every 
patient that comes through their emergency department.118 
 
 Thus, hospitals and health systems argue that Virginia’s COPN is necessary for them to 
remain viable. The COPN program limits incumbents from oversaturating an area and 
significantly reducing profits from centers that offer other essential services.119 Moreover, it is 
                                                      
 
116 See Brooke Murphy, Which Physicians Generate the Most Revenue for Hospitals?, BECKER’S 
HOSPITAL REVIEW (Apr. 12, 2016), https://www.beckershospitalreview.com/finance/which-
physicians-generate-the-most-revenue-for-hospitals.html.  
 
117 See Rawlings, supra note 10, at 2 (“If health care facilities and services clustered around more 
populous, wealthy communities as a result of deregulation, it stands to reason that less affluent, 
smaller, rural communities and inner cities would face new barriers to health care access as 
resources are distributed to other areas of the state.”).  
 
118 Katie O’Connor, The Story Behind the Certificate of Need: What It Is, Why It Exists, and Why 
It Has Been a Thorn in Virginia’s Side for Decades, Va. Mercury (Jan. 8, 2019), 
https://www.virginiamercury.com/2019/01/08/the-story-behind-the-certificate-of-need-what-it-
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119 See id. 
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not just private practitioners that must follow COPN regulations—these regulations apply to all 
health care players, including hospitals and health systems.120  
C. Does COPN Increase Charity Care? 
 As discussed, hospitals often must treat patients regardless of ability to pay due to federal 
regulations. Virginia hospitals also must see patients regardless of their third-party payors; 
consequently, hospitals render huge discounted medical services to patients insured by Medicaid, 
which reimburses at rates far below the cost of providing care.121 In fact, in 2017 Virginia 
hospitals absorbed more than $1.7 billion from underpayment for charity care and 
reimbursement and an additional $550 million from unpaid medical services.122  
 Unlike other states that employ extensive systems of public hospitals to provide indigent 
care,123 Virginia operates only two state-run general acute-care hospitals: University of Virginia 
Medical Center and Virginia Commonwealth University Medical Center.124 With a lack of state-
                                                      
120 See generally VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-102.3 (2019).   
 
121 Michael P. McDermott, Commentary: Certificates of Public Need Protect Health Care Safety 
Net, FREDERICKSBURG.COM (Feb. 19, 2019), 
https://www.fredericksburg.com/opinion/columns/commentary-certificates-of-public-need-
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122 See id.  
 
123 Hospitals by Ownership Type, Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation (2017), https://www.kff. 
org/other/state-indicator/hospitals-by-ownership/?dataView=1&currentTimeframe=0&sortModel 
=%7B%22colId%22:%22Location%22,%22sort%22:%22asc%22%7D (last visited Apr. 17, 
2019). Some states have many public hospitals, including California with 65, Kansas with 60, 
Texas with 103. Id. Virginia only has two government-run hospitals, accounting for only 2.1% of 
its entire hospital population. Id.  
 
124 See Michael Martz, Private Hospitals Challenge ‘Equity in State Funding’ Given to UVa, 
VCU Health Systems, DAILY PROGRESS (Dec. 20, 2014), 
https://www.dailyprogress.com/news/local/private-hospitals-challenge-equity-in-state-funding-
given-to-uva/article_1d4bfc94-88ab-11e4-922b-ffe8d4b4a7e1.html.   
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run facilities, Virginia relies on private providers to care for its indigent population and the 
COPN program helps accomplish this need. 
 Safety net providers are “providers that organize and deliver a significant level of both 
health care and other health-related services to the uninsured, Medicaid, and other vulnerable 
populations.”125  In Virginia, the hospitals have financial policies in place to assist uninsured and 
low-income patients and are often responsible for providing safety net care to such patients 
requiring emergency services.126 One of the most prominent justifications for Virginia’s COPN 
programs is that providers, safety-net hospitals in particular, require protection from competition 
in order to maintain sufficiently profitable services; these services are essential in insulating 
them against the uncompensated care provided to the indigent. The Commissioner also has the 
ability to condition certificates on the provision of indigent or charity care. Consequently, the 
burden of uncompensated care gets partially distributed amongst many healthcare providers, 
rather than falling solely on safety net providers.    
V. DOES MEDICAID EXPANSION ELIMINATE THE NEED FOR COPN? 
 The decision to expand Medicaid in Virginia significantly changed the state’s healthcare 
landscape. This expansion potentially increased insurance availability to 400,000 low-income 
adults in the state.127 With more people insured, the burdens of uncompensated care should 
                                                      
125 Definition of Safety Net Hospitals, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning a 
Evaluation, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMANS SERVS. (June 1, 2013), 
https://aspe.hhs.gov/report/environme ntal-scan-identify-major-research-questions-and-metrics-
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126 Health Safety Net Providers, VIRGINIA HEALTH CARE FOUNDATION, 
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March 22, 2019).  
 
127 See Vozzella, supra note 14.  
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consequently lessen. Thus, many question the future of Virginia’s COPN program. This Part will 
first evaluate whether COPN should persist now that the burdens of indigent care are lessening. 
It will then discuss other measures the COPN program can take to better support the health care 
industry in Virginia.  
A. Virginia Medicaid Expansion 
The Affordable Care Act (ACA), enacted in 2013, originally sought to expand Medicaid 
coverage in each state. The plan was to provide Medicaid coverage to individuals making up to 
133 percent of the federal poverty level (FPL).128 The Supreme Court’s decision in NFIB v. 
Sebelius, however, stripped the ACA’s mandatory state expansion by ruling it unconstitutional 
under the spending clause;129 as a result, Medicaid expansion became voluntary for the states.130 
Upon the initiation of Medicaid expansion in 2014, twenty-four states and Washington D.C. 
immediately opted for coverage—Virginia, however, was not one of those states.131 Four years 
later, in 2018, Virginia legislators opted in to Medicaid expansion, and it is projected that 
400,000 Virginians will qualify for and seek Medicaid coverage as a result.132  
B. What Does Medicaid Expansion Mean for COPN?  
                                                      
128 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), 
amended by Healthcare and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 
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129 567 U.S. 519, 585-87 (2012).  
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In light of Medicaid expansion, many wonder whether COPN is even necessary. Will it 
set unrealistic conditions on providers to deliver charity care in unobtainable numbers? Will this 
correct some of the market imbalances placed on hospitals in ways that favor adopting more 
competitive approaches to health care in the state?  
i. Charity Care Conditions After Medicaid Expansion  
Providers are concerned about meeting charity care conditions, as many more indigent 
patients will qualify for Medicaid. Currently, providers that are unable to meet the charity care 
conditions of their certificates are required to pay a penalty.133 Recently, however, HB 2766 was 
passed.134 This bill directs the Commissioner to conduct a triennial review of COPN charity care 
conditions to determine whether the conditions are appropriate or need revision.135 It further 
instructs the Commissioner to communicate the “appropriateness” of those conditions and 
develops a process by which a COPN holder may seek amendment.136 This measure seems 
appropriate, given the backdrop of decreased charity care demands in the state. However, the 
Commissioner may want to take immediate measures as well to lessen the risk of penalties for 
providers.  
Now that more Virginians are covered under Medicaid, the Commissioner should 
reevaluate all contested charity care conditions after a year of Medicaid expansion. In other 
words, through 2019 providers should continue attempting to reach the charity care percentages 
established by the Commissioner’s conditions; at the end of the year, however, the providers 
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135 See id.  
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should deliver reports indicating their ability to achieve such numbers and proposed reductions 
in the demand for charity care with supportive reasoning. The Commissioner can then choose to 
accept such plans or eliminate them. Whereas the Commissioner is instructed to review the 
charity care conditions every three years under the new bill, Medicaid expansion necessitates 
immediate review of the conditions before penalties are imposed. Thus, the Commissioner 
should review all contested conditions now and subsequently begin a triennial review process.  
ii. Is COPN Necessary Given the Reduced Strain on Hospitals? 
While Medicaid expansion undeniably decreases the burdens on health care providers to 
provide uncompensated charity care, state legislators should consider COPN reform, rather than 
COPN repeal, in response. Hospitals still face considerable burdens. Hospitals continue to 
provide charity care, as not all Virginians will gain coverage under Medicaid expansion.137 
Additionally, hospitals now face the added financial strain of two taxes that effectively support 
the Medicaid expansion.138 Hospitals also receive many Medicaid patients (now more than ever), 
and Medicaid continues to pay at reduced reimbursement rates.139 Thus, eliminating COPN 
regulations due to a reduced burden on hospitals would be premature and ill-considered.  
Although Medicaid expansion does lessen the uninsured population in Virginia, it does 
not cover all Virginians. Prior to Medicaid expansion, there were approximately 718,000 
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138 See Laura Vozzella & Gregory S. Schneider, Virginia General Assembly Approves Medicaid 
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uninsured people in Virginia.140 The Medicaid expansion anticipated covering 400,000 of those 
uninsured.141 However, this leaves over 300,000 Virginians without insurance, and those 
individuals will continue to rely on hospital emergency departments for care.142 In addition, 
Trump’s elimination of the individual mandate will likely lead to an increase in the number of 
uninsured persons nationally, particularly given the inevitable cost increases of health insurance 
premiums that result. In fact, it is predicted that between 2.8 million to 13 million fewer people 
will carry insurance due to the elimination of the individual mandate.143 Thus, regardless of the 
Medicaid expansion, hospitals likely will continue to struggle with uncompensated care because 
a large cohort of Virginians will remain uninsured.   
Medicaid expansion was supported by hospitals throughout Virginia because of the 
reduction in uncompensated care, but the hospitals are not ridding themselves entirely from the 
financial strain of charity care.144 In promoting Medicaid expansion, the hospitals reluctantly 
agreed to pay two new taxes—the first aims to raise $306 million to cover Virginia’s share of the 
Medicaid expansion, and the second seeks to raise $284 million which will be matched by the 
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142 See O’Connor, supra note 16. The article cites the executive director of the Virginia Health 
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federal government and used to raise Medicaid reimbursement rates.145 Thus, hospitals will 
continue to feel the financial burdens of uncompensated care—though this burden will now shift 
to supporting the insured in Virginia.  
Lastly, Medicaid pays very low reimbursement rates, often falling below the cost of the 
care.146 While the new tax on hospitals intends to increase the reimbursement rate for Medicaid 
services from 71 percent to 88 percent, 147 this value still falls below the actual cost of the 
service. Thus, hospitals, which cannot discriminate based on third-party payors, must continue to 
provide services at prices below cost for Medicaid patients.  
It is inaccurate to state that Medicaid expansion corrects the market imbalances placed on 
hospitals. While the burdens of uncompensated care should decrease, hospitals will continue to 
feel the financial burden of both charity care and the Medicaid expansion. Thus, repealing the 
COPN program for such reasons would fail to account for these factors.  
C. Medicaid Expansion Supports COPN Reform, Not Repeal  
 Because Medicaid expansion does not remove the financial strain placed on hospitals and 
will continue to require charity care, eliminating the COPN program in light of Medicaid 
expansion would be untimely. Instead of repeal, however, the Virginia legislature should 
                                                      
145 See Michael Martz, U.S. Approves New Taxes To Be Paid by Virginia Hospitals As State 
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consider reform measures that could boost the original three aims of the COPN program—
increased quality, increased access, and reduced cost.  
 First, as discussed previously, the Commissioner should be required to review the charity 
guidelines for all conditioned certificates to ensure that the charity care conditions are consistent 
following the Medicaid expansion. However, uninsured individuals are not the only medically 
underserved population in the state. In fact, approximately half of the communities in Virginia, 
especially those in inner city and rural areas, lack access to essential health services and 
providers.148 Thus, the Commissioner could expand charity care conditions to include all people 
within medically underserved areas, regardless of whether such patients are able to pay or not, 
thereby motivating health care facilities and providers to engage and extend services to these 
areas.  
 The legislature could also adopt standards that reward providers who meet objective cost 
and quality metrics. For instance, in Kentucky’s state health plan, hospitals that meet certain 
CMS quality thresholds or those that participate in federal value-based payment programs are 
deemed to be consistent with the state’s health plan, which ultimately gives them preference in 
seeking certification.149 While Virginia’s eight considerations listed in the COPN statute aim to 
incentivize quality and cost reduction,150 the Commissioner is given broad discretionary 
authority in weighing such factors. Thus, Virginia’s COPN program should consider 
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implementing quality and cost-reduction strategies that would give preferential treatment to 
providers meeting these metrics in a more objective fashion.  
CONCLUSION  
 Medicaid expansion largely changed the scene for health care providers in Virginia. 
Whereas many providers, specifically hospitals and health systems, struggled with managing 
uncompensated care burdens, Medicaid expansion will likely alleviate some of this financial 
strain. However, this will not correct the market imbalances that currently are a factor in 
maintaining Virginia’s COPN program. Hospitals and health systems will continue to carry 
financial burdens, as many Virginians remain uninsured and these providers face new burdens 
with additional taxes. Maintaining Virginia’s COPN program, at least until Virginia’s Medicaid 
expansion landscape is more established, is likely the appropriate action for Virginia’s General 
Assembly. In the meantime, the legislature should consider certain reform measures to increase 
access and quality and reduce costs throughout the state.   
  
  
  
